Smith v. Town of Pittston: Municipal Home Rule\u27s Narrow Escape from the Morass of Implicit Preemption by Wright, Shane
Maine Law Review 
Volume 57 




Smith v. Town of Pittston: Municipal Home Rule's Narrow Escape 
from the Morass of Implicit Preemption 
Shane Wright 
University of Maine School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the State and Local 
Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shane Wright, Smith v. Town of Pittston: Municipal Home Rule's Narrow Escape from the Morass of 
Implicit Preemption, 57 Me. L. Rev. 613 (2005). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol57/iss2/13 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of 
Maine School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
SMITH v. TOWN OF PITTSTON: MUNICIPAL HOME




A. The Traditional Relationship Between the State and Municipalities
B. Home Rule
1. The Constitutional Amendment and Enabling Legislation
2. Judicial Interpretation
II. SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT
IV. SMrrH v. TowN OF PITSTON
V. ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Construction
B. Significance of Home Rule
C. The Role of the Legislature vs. the Role of the Judiciary
VI. CONCLUSION
MAINE LAW REVIEW
SMITH v. TOWN OF PITTSTON: MUNICIPAL HOME
RULE'S NARROW ESCAPE FROM THE MORASS OF
IMPLICIT PREEMPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In Smith v. Town of Pittston, 1 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the
Law Court, upheld a municipal ordinance adopted by the town of Pittston that
prohibited the spreading of septage within Pittston. 2 The majority3 held that
Pittston's ordinance did not violate the Maine Hazardous Waste, Septage and Solid
Waste Management Act (Solid Waste Management Act), 4 which "govem[s] the
disposal of garbage, sludge, septage and other waste."'5 The majority interpreted
the "home rule" statute6 as granting sufficient authority to Pittston, as a municipal
corporation, to enact the ordinance at issue.7 The dissent, on the other hand, would
have held the ordinance to be incompatible with the state's statutory scheme con-
trolling the disposal of septage. 8
An analysis of the statutory schemes controlling waste management and mu-
nicipal home rule, along with rules of statutory construction, demonstrates that the
majority opinion best reflects legislative intent. However, the role and fate of
municipal home rule warrant a different approach to state preemption of local au-
thority. This Note considers the background of municipal authority and the estab-
lishment of home rule in the process of ascertaining legislative intent and the over-
all objectives that the Legislature sought to achieve. Although in this case a statu-
tory construction approach led the Law Court to uphold Pittston's authority, it did
so on narrow grounds and by a one-vote margin. The danger of home rule being
undermined by implied state preemption calls for more guidance from the legisla-
ture and an amended approach to preemption cases.
II. MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY
In describing municipal authority, the Maine Constitution provides that "[tihe
inhabitants of any municipality shall have the power to alter and amend their char-
ters on all matters, not prohibited by Constitution or general law, which are local
and municipal in character. The Legislature shall prescribe the procedure by which
the municipality may so act." 9 This constitutional provision granting "home rule"
to Maine municipalities was adopted in 1969.10 "Home rule" is a term of art
1. 2003 ME 46, 820 A.2d 1200.
2. Id. W 10, 31,820 A.2d at 1208-09.
3. Four justices agreed that the ordinance was legitimate while the three remaining justices
joined in dissent. See id. 39, 820 A.2d at 1210.
4. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1301-1319-Y (West 2001 & Supp. 2003).
5. Smith v. Town of Pittston, 2003 ME 46, 120, 820 A.2d at 1204.
6. ME. Rav. STAT. ANNs. tit. 30-A, § 3001 (West 1996).
7. Smith v. Town of Pittston, 2003 ME 46, 99 29-31, 820 A.2d at 1207-09.
8. Id. 43, 820A.2d at 1212.
9. Me. Const. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1.
10. See Robert W. Bower, Jr., Home Rule and the Pre-Emption Doctrine: The Relationship
Between State and Local Government in Maine, 37 ME. L. REv. 313, 340-42 (1985).
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generally connoting municipal autonomy. 11 In order to gain a complete under-
standing of Maine's home rule scheme, and accordingly its significance for the
Smith case, it is useful, if not necessary, to examine the historical relationship
between the state and its municipalities and the developments that culminated in
the state granting municipalities home rule in 1969.
A. The Traditional Relationship Between the State and Municipalities
By the late seventeenth century, charters granted to English municipalities
conferred a corporate status, and municipalities began to be viewed as an arm of
the central government rather than independent entities. 12 The view that munici-
pal corporations were no different than any other corporation created by the state
was solidified when the King's Bench upheld the King's right to revoke municipal
charters in 1683.13 The British system was imported to the American colonies and
as a result, the approach to local governance embodied by the granting of munici-
pal charters by the state became the normal and accepted approach in the United
States. 14 Despite the acceptance of the grant approach to municipal authority, a
number of state courts in their interpretation of state constitutions held that there
was a degree of local autonomy beyond the reach of the state legislature. 15 How-
11. Id. at 313 n. I ("'As a political symbol "home rule" is generally understood to be synony-
mous with local autonomy, the freedom of a local unit of government to pursue self-determined
goals without interference by the legislature or other agencies of state government."') (quoting
Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts,
48 MiNN. L. REV. 643, 644 (1964)).
12. See id. at 319. Bower notes the irony of this developing legal fiction in light of the "plain
fact [that] the historic cities of Europe today are all older than the state that legally claims these
rights, and had an independent existence before their right to exist was recognized!" Id. at 319
n.45.
13. See id. at 320 (citing The King v. Mayor and Commonalty of London, 89 Eng. Rep. 930
(K.B. 1683)).
14. Id.
15. See, for example, People ex rel. Leroy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871), where the court
stated:
The state may mould local institutions according to its views of policy or expediency;
but local government is a matter of absolute right; and the state cannot take it away. It
would be the boldest mockery... to call that system one of constitutional freedom
under which it should be equally admissible to allow the people full control in their
local affairs, or no control at all.
Id. at 108 (Cooley, J., concurring). The Indiana Supreme Court later came to a similar conclu-
sion, stating:
It is, perhaps, true that the General Assembly may, at will, pass laws regulating the
government of towns and cities, taking from them powers which had previously been
granted, or adding to that which had previously been given, but we do not think that it
can take away from the people of a town or city rights which they possessed as citi-
zens of the State before their incorporation.... The construction of sewers in a city,
the supply of gas, water, fire protection, and many other matters that might be men-
tioned, are matters in which the local community alone are concerned, and in which
the State has no special interest, more than it has in the health and prosperity of the
people generally, and they are matters over which the people affected thereby have
the exclusive control, and it cannot, in our opinion, be taken away from them by the
Legislature.
State ex. rel. Jameson v. Denny, 21 N.E. 252, 257 (Ind. 1889). The Iowa Supreme Court also
seemed to agree with this broad proposition:
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ever, the Supreme Court did not share those views, but rather, established the con-
trolling rule that municipalities were merely creatures of the state. 16 In Worcester
v. Worcester Consolidated Street Railway Co.,17 the Court held that a contract.
between the city of Worcester and the railway company requiring the railway to
keep utilized portions of the street in good repair was abrogated when the state
amended the statutory scheme in a manner that removed maintenance require-
ments from railroads. 18 Central to the Court's reasoning was the determination
that:
A municipal corporation is simply a political subdivision of the State, and exists
by virtue of the exercise of the power of the State through its legislative depart-
ment. The legislature could at any time terminate the existence of the corpora-
tion itself, and provide other and different means for the government of the dis-
trict comprised within the limits of the former city. The city is the creature of the
State. 19
The historical relationship between the State of Maine and its municipalities
was in accord with the national pattern upheld by the Supreme Court. 20 In 1821,
the year after Maine's separation from Massachusetts, the Legislature codified the
relationship between the state and its municipalities, adopting the "grant approach"
But from time immemorial every municipal government, properly so called, and act-
ing within its peculiar sphere, has acted through its common council, composed either
of the burgesses or their representatives, subject in some cases to checks and vetoes,
but not subject to legislation or final action in defiance of their own decisions. Their
supremacy cannot be given up by themselves any more than it can be taken from
them. No doubt the state can limit their powers, but it cannot transfer them. The
appointment and incorporation of boards as mere agencies is competent, and may be
very convenient. But making them anything but agencies is a direct invasion of rep-
resentative government, and would bring into existence a class of cities unknown to
our constitutions, and very different from the municipal corporations recognized by
our constitution as the authorized recipients of local legislative power.
State ex. rel. Howe v. City of Des Moines, 72 N.W. 639, 643 (Iowa 1897).
16. See Comm'rs of Laramie County v. Comm'rs of Albany County, 92 U.S. 307 (1875). The
Court reasoned that:
Such corporations are composed of all the inhabitants of the Territory included in the
political organization; and the attribute of individuality is conferred on the entire mass
of such residents, and it may be modified or taken away at the mere will of the legis-
lature, according to its own views of public convenience, and without any necessity
for the consent of those composing the body politic.
Id. at 310.
17. 196 U.S. 539 (1905).
18. id. at 542, 552-53.
19. Id. at 548-49. See also Bower, supra note 10, at 320-23 (discussing the grant approach to
municipal authority).
20. See, e.g., Inhabitants of Gorham v. Inhabitants of Springfield, 21 Me. 58, 61 (1842)
("[Public corporations] exist[] at the pleasure of the State, and not at their own pleasure.").
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to municipal authority.2 1 The grant approach views municipalities as corporations
deriving all of their power and authority from statutory grants from the state.22
Furthermore, they are empowered to act only within the confines of that grant;
there exists no residual authority to act beyond the scope authorized by the state.2 3
The Law Court interpreted the statutory scheme granting municipal authority in
1824 in Bussey v. Gilmore.24 In Bussey, the court held that the town of Bangor did
not have the authority to levy a tax upon its citizens in order to pay on a contract
for a bridge across the Kenduskeag stream.2 5 The grant of authority 26 did not
explicitly issue authority for the building of bridges, therefore, the court deemed
that the only possible source of authority was the general grant embodied in the
words "and other necessary charges. ' 27 Because the general language needed to
be given a "reasonable limitation, '2 8 the court held that it could not possibly in-
clude the building of bridges.2 9 The court reasoned that "necessary charges" only
21. Bower, supra note 10, at 333. Section 6 of the statute stated:
Be it further enacted, That the citizens of any town, qualified as aforesaid, at the
annual meeting for the choice of town officers, or at any other town meeting, regu-
laly warned, may grant and vote such sum or sums of money as they shall judge
necessary for the settlement, maintenance and support of the ministry, schools, the
poor, and other necessary charges, arising within the same town, to be assessed upon
the polls... and ... empowered to make and agree upon such necessary rules, orders
and by-laws, for the directing, managing and ordering the prudential affairs of such
town, as they shall judge most conducive to the peace, welfare and good order thereof;
and to annex penalties for the observance of the same not exceeding five dollars for
one offence, to enure to such uses as they shall therein direct: Provided, They be not
repugnant to the general laws of this State: And provided also, Such orders and by-
laws shall have the approbation of the Court of Sessions of the same county.
Act of March 19, 1821, ch. 114, § 6, 1821 Me. Laws 459, 463.
22. See Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375 (1837). In Hooper, the Law Court stated that:
"The inhabitants of every town in this State are declared to be a body politic and
corporate" by the statute; but these corporations derive none of their powers from, nor
are any duties imposed upon them by, the common law. They have been denominated
quasi corporations, and their whole capacities, powers, and duties are derived from
legislative enactments.
Id. at 377.
23. See Phillips Village Corp. v. Phillips Water Co., 71 A. 474, 475 (Me. 1908) ("Being a
creature of statute, it had only such powers as were conferred by statute expressly or by neces-
sary implication."). The Law Court has also declared that:
The [city] is but a creature of the state, engaged in exercising some of the functions of
government in a limited locality, not for any private purposes, but solely for the pub-
lic good.... A municipal corporation is nothing more than an instrumentality of the
state for the purpose of local government, exercising delegated powers, which the
state itself can exercise and may withdraw at pleasure.
Chase v. Inhabitants of Town of Litchfield, 182 A. 921, 925 (Me. 1936) (quoting Hughes v. City
of Auburn, 55 N.E. 389, 391 (N.Y 1899).
24. 3 Me. 191 (1824).
25. Id.
26. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27. Bussey v. Gilmore, 3 Me. at 195-96 (citing Act of Mar. 23, 1786, ch. 75, 1784-1785 Mass.
Acts 605). The Massachusetts statute had been, in the words of the court, "re-enacted in our
revised statutes." Id. at 195. The court refers to the Massachusetts version of the statute because
the contract with the Bangor Bridge Company had been entered into prior to the separation of
Maine from nhe rest of Massachusetts. Id.
28. Id. at 196.
29. Id.
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included expenditures that were incidental to the explicit grants of authority.30
Although it was codified and firmly accepted and enforced by the courts, the
grant approach was not without its drawbacks. The three basic problems were: (1)
the requirement that municipalities get specific authorization from the state legis-
lature for any local issue not addressed by a statutory grant; (2) local issues and
problems were becoming increasingly complex and therefore required flexible
solutions; and (3) local affairs and sentiment were at the mercy of state regula-
tion.3 1 In Squires v. Inhabitants ofAugusta,32 the split opinion of the court reflects
the aforementioned problems of the grant approach. The town of Augusta enacted
an ordinance permitting non-public school children to be bused to and from school
on the buses paid for by the public funds. 33 The impetus behind the ordinance was
the safety of the children in light of increased traffic and the reciprocal increased
danger to young children walking to school. 34 A majority of the court held that the
ordinance was beyond the scope of the authority granted to the town and was there-
fore invalid. 35 The dissenting justices, on the other hand, opined that local offi-
cials needed more flexibility in the scope of their authority in order to address
developing problems and contingencies that could not have been anticipated when
the general grant had been given. 36 It was those issues faced by the citizens of
Augusta, as they existed in the locality at that time, which needed to be addressed. 37
30. Id. The court stated:
Without enumerating the objects which this term, other necessary charges, may be
understood to embrace, it may in general be considered as extending to such expenses
as are clearly incident to the execution of the power granted, or which necessarily
arise in the fulfillment of the duties imposed by law. It is not pretended that the
contract made with the bridge-company, was necessary to the discharge of any corpo-
rate duty. Towns are not required, nor have they the power, to provide for the erection
of bridges over tide or navigable waters. The powers granted to towns are specified
and defined by statute; and we have discovered no one to which a charge of this sort
can be considered as incident.
Id. (emphasis in original).
31. Bower, supra note 10, at 336-37.
32. 155 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959).
33. Id. at 81-82.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 88, Although the court noted the potential constitutional issue, they did not address
that issue because they were able to decide the case on other grounds. Id.
36. Id. at I 11 (Sullivan & Dubord, JJ., dissenting). The dissenting justices stated:
"[Police] power is not something which is rigid and definitely fixed; on the contrary,
in its very nature it must be considerably elastic within limits in order to meet the
changing and shifting conditions which from time to time arise through the increase
and shift of population and the flux and complexity of commercial and social rela-
tions."
id. (quoting 6 McQutLIN: MUNICIPAL CORPORAIONS § 24.03 (3rd ed.)).
37. Id. The justices stated:
The ordinance responds to a purely modem exigency, traffic disasters in alarming
arithmetic progression.... Our age differs from those immediately preceding it be-
cause of our acceptance of social concepts as contrasted with the individualistic atti-
tudes of other times. Rapid developments in social, political and economic life pro-
duce an always increasing complexity of society and broaden the social service field.
School children have welfare needs not known before.
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As demonstrated by Squires, the grant approach did not permit local officials
to address certain local needs because the grant of authority from the state had not
specifically anticipated those needs. As the dissenting justices in Squires stated,
changes in society and increasingly complex local issues warranted more flexibil-
ity in local authority. Not only expecting, but requiring the state legislature to
address varying local issues created a situation that was neither ideal nor efficient
for either local citiO,,ns or the state.
B. Home Rule
1. The Constitutional Amendment and Enabling Legislation
Ostensibly in response to the problems with the grant approach, in 1967, a
commission was formed to study the matter and issue a report to the Governor and
Legislature. 38 In its 1968 report, the Maine Intergovernmental Relations Com-
mission proposed a constitutional amendment establishing municipal home rule.39
In laying out the purposes of the proposed amendment, the Commission touched
upon the concepts of local accountability, increased flexibility, and relieving the
state of a burden.40 In achieving local accountability, the Commission stated that:
"Home Rule accomplishes the basic philosophy of government in allowing the
people most directly affected by the governing body, to rule the governing body."4 1
Increased local flexibility could be accomplished by giving municipal officials
authority to make necessary charter amendments and enact ordinances designed to
address local issues.42 Finally, the state would no longer be responsible to respond
to each local contingency on an independent basis but would be able to delegate
that function to local elected officials.43
38. See MAINE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON HOME RULE (1968).
39. Id. at 2. Although the Commission spoke of home rule as a new system, the term itself
had, at times, been used to refer to the Legislature's grant of authority to municipalities. See,
e.g., Lemaire v. Crockett, 101 A. 302 (Me. 1917).
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id.
42. Id. The Commission reported: "Through charter amendments and alterations, munici-
palities may readily merge service functions and provide more efficient and complete services
to the community. The broader functions will also permit the municipality to exercise the nec-
essary alternatives that it may encounter as circumstances change." Id.
43. Id. ("Indirectly, Municipal Home Rule will relieve the state of a cumbersome... obliga-
tion of altering the local charters to meet the local need (such can only be done on a biannual
basis). The state incurs considerable expense when such matters are considered during the
legislative session."). During legislative debate on the home rule amendment, it became clear
that concern over the necessity and expense of state action to alter municipal charters was para-
mount:
It makes no sense to me that the Legislature should determine what charter changes
should be made by the cities and towns of our state .... I believe we have at least 70
or 77 charter changes in this Legislature [thus far] which takes a lot of time, a lot of
energy, and a lot of cost.
Bower, supra note 10, at 337 n. 144 (quoting 2 ME. LEGiS. REc. 3257 (1969) (statement of Rep.
Sahagian)); Representative Lund expressed the following feelings:
[Tlhere are many many issues of statewide importance... which we fail to deal with
effectively as we would like to because we do not have the time to do so.... [Hiome
rule is one logical and effective way of cutting down on the number of local issues
that divert a good deal of the attention and time of the Legislature ....
Id. (quoting 2 ME. LEGIs. REc. 3257-58 (1969) (statement of Rep. Lund)).
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As ultimately enacted, the constitutional amendment provided municipalities
with "power to alter and amend their charters on all matters, . . which are local
and municipal in character."44 The amendment also established authority in the
legislature to "prescribe the procedure" by which such charter alterations or amend-
ments may be carried out.45 As currently codified, the enabling legislation is found
in Title 30-A of the Maine Revised Statutes. 46 Chapter 111 of the Title declares
that its purpose "is to implement the home rule powers granted to municipalities
by the Constitution of Maine, Article VIII, Part Second."'47 The Chapter provides
procedures relating to municipal charters, 48 and ultimately states that "[t]his chap-
ter, being necessary for the welfare of the municipalities and their inhabitants,
shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purposes."4 9 More directly related to
Smith v. Town of Pittston, is Chapter 141 of the Title addressing municipal ordi-
nances. 50 Section 3001 of the Chapter generally establishes municipal authority:
Any municipality, by the adoption, amendment or repeal of ordinances or by-
laws, may exercise any power or function which the Legislature has power to
confer upon it, which is not denied either expressly or by clear implication, and
exercise any power or function granted to the municipality by the Constitution of
Maine, general law or charter.5 1
Moreover, subsections one through three make it very clear that the Legislature
intended local authority to be very broad. The subsections provide:
1. Liberal construction. This section, being necessary for the welfare of the mu-
nicipalities and their inhabitants, shall be liberally construed to effect its pur-
poses.
2. Presumption of authority. There is a rebuttable presumption that any ordi-
nance enacted under this section is a valid exercise of a municipality's home rule
authority.
3. Standard of preemption. The Legislature shall not be held to have implicitly
denied any power granted to municipalities under this section unless the munici-
pal ordinance in question would frustrate the purpose of any state law.5 2
The combination of the language in Article VIII of the state constitution, section
3001 of Title 30-A of the Revised Code, and the report by the Intergovernmental
Relations Commission53 warrant the conclusion that the Legislature intended to
44. ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1. The section provides in full:
Power of municipalities to amend their charters. The inhabitants of any municipality
shall have the power to alter and amend their charters on all matters, not prohibited by
Constitution or general law, which are local and municipal in character. The Legisla-
ture shall prescribe the procedure by which the municipality may so act.
Id.
45. Id.
46. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 1-7503 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003).
47. id. § 2101.
48. Id. §§ 2102-2105.
49. Id. § 2109.
50. Id. §§ 3001-3012.
51. Id. § 3001.
52. Id. §§ 3001(1)-(3).
53. See MAINE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON HOME RULE 4 (1968)
(stating that "Home Rule should accomplish the independence within the municipality as was
required and requested by this country from England in the years 1775-1783" and that "towns
and cities will be given the opportunity to operate within their domain in a sphere of indepen-
dence such as was won during the Revolutionary War.").
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grant municipalities a significant degree of autonomy in local matters. 54 The statu-
tory scheme endows municipalities with as much authority as the Legislature has
the power to confer, contingent only upon the Legislature's authority to limit that
power.55 Moreover, that authority is accompanied by a requirement of liberal
construction and a presumption of validity.56 Municipal home rule was intended
to be more than rhetoric.
2. Judicial Interpretation
Despite the apparent intent of the Legislature, the scope of municipal autonomy
has not always been subject to consistent judicial construction. 57 The problem
seems to have been facilitated by, if not a direct result of, the grant approach that
had controlled for approximately a century and a half, and the existence of statu-
tory grants of authority still present in the Code despite the establishment of home
rule. 58 In Town of Waterboro v. Lessard,59 the Law Court was called upon to
decide the validity, or lack thereof, of an ordinance enacted by Waterboro that
regulated the proximity of construction to property boundary lines.60 The court
stated the "basic issue" as being "whether § 5(a) of the municipal ordinance is
authorized by 30 M.R.S.A. § 2151."61 The decision was entirely based upon the
construction of section 2151 of the Revised Code, which, in part, regulated the
design and construction of buildings and building additions, and the effect or im-
pact of home rule was not discussed. 6 2 Because a setback requirement was not
within the scope of section 2151, Waterboro's ordinance was held to be invalid.6 3
A year later in Town of Windham v. LaPointe,64 the court, again, not only ignored
the impact of home rule, but founded its opinion on the grant approach, in direct
contradiction to the new home rule scheme. 65 Rather than seek to determine if
54. Municipal autonomy, to whatever degree it was intended, did not change the underlying
fact that municipalities are corporate entities established by the state and subject to its authority.
See ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1; see also Schwanda v. Bonney, 418 A.2d 163, 165 (Me. 1980)
("Municipal corporations, as public bodies, may exercise only such powers as the Legislature
has conferred upon them by law or which may have been granted to them directly by the Consti-
tution.").
55. See tit. 30-A, § 3001; supra text accompanying note 51.
56. See tit. 30-A, §§ 3001(1)-(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 2003); supra text accompanying note
52.
57. For additional discussion of the Law Court's interpretation of home rule, see Bower,
supra note 10, at 344-63.
58. See, e.g., Town of Windham v. LaPointe, 308 A.2d 286 (Me. 1973).
59. 287 A.2d 126 (Me. 1972).
60. Id. at 127.
61. Id. at 128.
62. Id. at 128-30. Furthermore, the court stated:
"It is an accepted rule that when a municipal corporation is empowered by express
grant to make by-laws or ordinances in certain cases and for certain purposes, its
power of legislation is limited to the cases and objects specified.... And it is held
that if a bylaw or ordinance as drawn is outside the scope of the grant and exceeds the
powers to legislate conferred upon the municipality, it is invalid."
Id. at 129 (quoting State v. Brown, 135 Me. 36, 38-39, 188 A. 713, 714-15 (1936) (omission in
original)).
63. Id. at 129.
64. 308 A.2d 286 (Me. 1973).
65. See id. at 290.
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Windham's authority to regulate house trailers had been denied, the court inquired
whether or not such authority had been granted.66 Moreover, the town itself ar-
gued that it had authority based on a general grant of police power under section
2151 rather than home rule authority.67
Although the court's acceptance and consideration of home rule came slowly,
it did eventually take hold. In Clardy v. Town of Livermore,68 the court held that
Livermore's ordinance prescribing minimum frontage was not applicable to the
Clardys' land because they had owned it prior to enactment of the ordinance.6 9 By
holding the ordinance not applicable on that ground, the court did not have to
reach the issue of whether or not the ordinance constituted a taking. 70 Therefore,
in keeping with the judicial canon of avoiding constitutional questions when a
statute or ordinance can be so interpreted, the court did not reach Livermore's
contention that home rule permitted it to enact such an ordinance. 7 1 Commenting
on the town's argument, however, the court stated, "[wie agree with defendant
Town that the issues it raises in this case are important as portents of many, and
major, transformations that have been wrought by the advent of municipal home-
rule in the legal framework which has governed, for so long, the interrelations of
State and municipal authority."72
In Schwanda v. Bonney,73 the court not only interpreted the home rule doc-
trine, but employed a key component of the legislative scheme: state preemp-
tion.74 In Schwanda, the court invalidated an ordinance enacted by the town of
Freeport that required an applicant for a concealed weapons license to demonstrate
that he needed the license for personal protection or for use in the course of his
employment. 75 This need requirement was in addition to the state's statutory re-
quirement that an applicant demonstrate "good moral character." 76 The court cited
constitutional home rule and the enabling legislation, but found that neither gave
Freeport the authority to regulate the issuance of concealed weapons licenses in
the manner it had chosen. 77 The court based its opinion on two somewhat compet-
66. Id. The court stated:
A municipality in this State has no inherent police power. It may exercise only such
powers as are expressly conferred upon it by the Legislature or as are necessarily
implied from those expressly so conferred .... "A municipal corporation has no
element of sovereignty. It is a mere local agency of the state, having no other powers
than such as are clearly and unmistakably granted by the law-making power."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Inhabitants of Town of Frankfort v. Waldo Lumber Co., 128 Me.
1, 4, 145 A. 241,242 (1929)).
67. Id. ("The plaintiff Town claims the power to regulate house trailers through a police
power ordinance, as distinguished from a zoning ordinance, from the general grant of power
contained in 30 M.R.S.A. s. 215 l(4)(A).").
68. 403 A.2d 779 (Me. 1979).
69. Id. at 782.
70. Id. at 781-82.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 781.
73. 418 A.2d 163 (Me. 1980).
74. See id.; see also ME. REV. STAr. ANN. tit. 30-A, §§ 3001(1)-(3) (West 1996 & Supp. 2003);
supra text accompanying note 52.
75. 418A.2dat 164-65.
76. Id. at 164.
77. Id. at 167.
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ing rationales that reflected the ongoing problem with the application of home
rule. Quoting the constitutional grant of authority, the court stated that "[t]he li-
censing act has statewide application; it does not involve 'matters... which are
local and municipal in character.' ' ' 78 Moreover, the court quoted the language of
the home rule enabling statute79 and concluded that "municipal regulation beyond
the statutory requirements of legal residency and good moral character in the li-
censing of persons to carry concealed weapons is by clear implication denied by
the enabling legislative provisions." 80 The authority was denied by clear implica-
tion because the state had "preempt[ed] the field respecting regulatory require-
ments in the issuance of concealed weapons." 8 1
The two rationales employed are contradictory, because, unlike the language
of the constitution, the enabling legislation does not appear to constrain municipal
authority to only those matters which are local in character. Rather, it conveys any
power that the legislature has authority to convey unless such has been denied.82
The court's interpretation of these seemingly contradictory grants of authority will
be of utmost importance in defining the scope of home rule, particularly in light of
the apparent view of the Legislature as stated by the Intergovernmental Relations
Commission report:
If the municipality fails to adhere to the law allowing Home Rule, abuses the
enacting legislation, or fails to operate under Home Rule in a manner consistent
with the philosophy therein, the Courts will be called upon to act. The Courts in
replacing a legislature in this role will furnish stability to decisions that are made.
The stability stems from the doctrine of "stare decisis" whereby one decision is
rule or [sic] law as to how the Court will act in a similar set of circumstances. 83
Similar to Freeport's authority in Schwanda, the court found the town of
Boothbay Harbor's authority in regard to liquor licenses to be implicitly preempted
in Ullis v. Inhabitants of the Town of Boothbay Harbor.84 The town of Boothbay
Harbor had enacted an ordinance that prohibited any additional restaurants that
served liquor with meals from obtaining a liquor license unless it was located at
78. Id. (quoting ME. CoNsT. art. VIII, pt. 2, § 1).
79. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 1917 (West 1978) (current version at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
30-A, § 3001 (West 1996 & Supp. 2003)) ("Any municipality... may exercise any power or
function which the Legislature has power to confer upon it, which is not denied either expressly
or by clear implication.").
80. Schwanda v. Bonney, 418 A.2d at 167.
81. Id. at 165.
82. See ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 3001 (West 1996).
83. MAINE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON HoM-E RULE 2 (1968). It is
worth noting in this regard that although the court was beginning to embrace home rule, as
demonstrated by Clardy and Schwanda, reliance upon the grant approach had not been entirely
eradicated. See, e.g., Spain v. City of Brewer, 474 A.2d 496 (Me. 1984). In Spain, the court held
that Brewer could not deny an application for an 'automobile graveyard' because it violated
local zoning ordinances or for environmental concerns. Id. at 499-500. The court stated
"[miunicipal corporations ... may exercise only such powers as have been granted to them
directly by our state constitution or which the Legislature has conferred upon them by statute."
Id. at 498.
84. 459 A.2d 153 (Me. 1983).
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least 1200 feet from any other restaurant of that class. 85 The court held that the
state's "liquor licensing scheme" preempted any municipal regulation. 86 In hold-
ing such, the court stated that the ordinance "works at cross purposes to the state's
liquor licensing statutes, and therefore impermissibly conflicts with them."'87 Sig-
nificant to the court's determination that the state statutory scheme was intended to
preempt additional municipal regulation was the fact that the state permitted mu-
nicipalities to regulate in two specific ways.88 Municipalities were permitted, by
referendum, to prohibit specified classes of liquor licenses altogether and also to
establish additional requirements for establishments that provided entertainment
as well as liquor.89
The amendments to the enabling statute in 198790 and the subsequent judicial
decisions based upon the new statute were much more favorable to municipalities
and home rule. In Central Maine Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon,9 1 the court
upheld a Lebanon ordinance prohibiting the commercial, non-agricultural spray-
ing of herbicides without town approval. 92 The court held that the state's statutory
scheme addressing pesticides neither explicitly nor implicitly preempted local regu-
lation. 93 Central to that determination was the court's analysis of the purpose of
the state statutes-the protection of public health, safety, welfare, and the state's
natural resources; the court found that the Town of Lebanon's ordinance did not
conflict with those purposes.94 In regard to the furtherance of the state's purposes
in regulating pesticides, the court stated: "By requiring a more stringent review
process for certain types of pesticide use than that found in the two Maine pesti-
cide acts, the Lebanon ordinance shares and advances these same purposes." 95
Similarly, in School Committee of York v. Town of York, 96 the court gave a
broad interpretation to municipal home rule, including addressing the apparent
85. Id. at 155. The ordinance stated in relevant part:
An establishment which serves liquor along with its meals contributes more heavily
to parking problems due to the length of time its patrons spend in said establishment.
Furthermore, the close proximity of liquor serving establishments in Boothbay Har-
bor has caused unnecessary noise and public disturbances as patrons travel from one
such establishment to the next. In addition, the residents of Boothbay Harbor are
opposed to any more liquor serving establishments in downtown Boothbay Harbor,
out of concern for their own safety and personal well-being as well as that of their
children. Consequently, no further Class H licenses shall be granted in Boothbay
Harbor beyond the ones which exist at the adoption date of this Ordinance, unless the
establishment requesting said license is at least 1200 feet distant from any other Class
H licensee.
id. at 155 n.1 (quoting section 8.3 of Boothbay Harbor's victualer's ordinance).
86. Id. at 159.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 158.
89. Id.
90. P.L. 1987, ch. 737, pt. A, § 2.
91. 571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990).
92. Id. at 1190-91.
93. Id. at 1194.
94. ld. at 1194-95. The court looked to the purpose in response to the home rule enabling
statute's standard for preemption. Id. at 1193-94; see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, §
3001(3) (West 1996).
95. Cent. Maine Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon, 571 A.2d at 1195.
96. 626 A.2d 935 (Me. 1993).
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contradiction between the constitutional provision and the enabling statute.9 7 The
Town of York enacted its first charter in 1991, and in the process "divested budget-
ary authority from the School Committee"; the School Committee then challenged
the validity of the charter.9 8 In the process of upholding the charter, the court
examined the Legislature's intent embodied by the home rule amendments adopted
in 1987.99 In the court's view, the amendments to the enabling legislation made it"clear that the Legislature intended to convey a plenary grant of the state's police
power to municipalities, subject only to express or implied limitations." 10 0 Be-
cause of the Legislature's intent to convey a plenary grant to municipalities, the
court found that the original version of the enabling legislation permitted "local
legislation in areas beyond those 'local and municipal in character."' 10 1 The court
garnered additional support from the Committee Report, which stated:
The standard [of review set out in 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001] reaffirms the funda-
mental principle of home rule, that municipalities have been given a plenary grant
of power.... Only where the municipal ordinance prevents the efficient accom-
plishment of a defined state purpose should a municipality's home rule power be
restricted, otherwise they are free to act to promote the well-being of their citi-
zens. 102
Furthermore, the court refuted the argument that Title 20-A, regulating educational
matters, created a comprehensive scheme implicitly preempting local regulation. 103
Again, quoting the Committee Report, the opinion states: "The mere fact that
there is a state law, or even a multitude of state laws on a subject is by itself irrel-
evant; the key is whether the Legislature intended to exclusively occupy the field
and thereby deny a municipality's home rule authority to act in the same area."' 104
Two preemption cases with an even greater significance to Smith v. Town of
Pittston are Midcoast Disposal, Inc. v. Town of Union 10 5 and Sawyer Environmen-
tal Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden. 106 In Midcoast Disposal, Inc.,
97. Id. at 938-39.
98. Id. at 937-38.
99. Id. at 938-42.
100. Id. at 938 (citations omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 938 n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting Report of the Joint Standing Committee on
Local and County Government on the Revision of Title 30, at 11 (Dec. 1986)).
103. Id. at 941. Title 20-A, section 2 provides:
The state policy on public education is as follows.
1. State responsibility for public education. In accordance with the Constitution of
Maine, Article VIII, the Legislature shall enact the laws that are necessary to assure
that all school administrative units make suitable provisions for the support and main-
tenance of the public schools. It is the intent of the Legislature that every person
within the age limitations prescribed by state statutes shall be provided an opportu-
nity to receive the benefits of a free public education.
2. Local control of public education. It is the intent of the Legislature that the control
and management of the public schools shall be vested in the legislative and governing
bodies of local school administrative units, as long as those units are in compliance
with appropriate state statutes.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 2 (West 2003) (emphasis omitted).
104. School Comm. of York v. Town of York, 626 A.2d at 941 (quoting Report of the Joint
Standing Committee on Local and County Government on the Revision of Title 30, at 8 (Dec.
1986)).
105. 537 A.2d 1149 (Me. 1988).
106. 2000 ME 179, 760 A.2d 257.
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the court held that the state, through the Solid Waste Management Act, had implic-
itly preempted municipal authority in the area of solid waste disposal.10 7 Preemp-
tion was deemed implied due to the "'comprehensive and exclusive regulatory
scheme"' adopted by the state Legislature. 10 8 Significant to the court's reasoning
was the Act's declaration of policy seeking to address the increasing amount of
waste and the inefficient methods in place to deal with it, and to encourage "'pub-
lic or private' solid waste programs that reduce the actual volume of solid waste
generated and increase the quantity of waste that is recycled and reused in a safe
manner." 109
Similarly, in Sawyer, the court held that the Solid Waste Management Act
preempted the Town of Hampden's prohibition of Sawyer Environmental's expan-
sion beyond the border of the original landfill.110 As part of the Department of
Environmental Protection application process for expansion, Sawyer notified
Hampden of its intentions.111 This notification was required by section 1310-S of
the Solid Waste Management Act and granted Hampden intervenor status in the
application process. 112 The court deemed the granting of intervenor status to be
evidence that the state Legislature intended municipalities to have only a limited
role in the application process, not authority to prohibit expansion all together., 13
Furthermore, section 1310-U of the Solid Waste Management Act prohibits mu-
nicipalities from enacting stricter standards than those in the statute or the associ-
107. Midcoast Disposal, Inc. v. Town of Union, 537 A.2d at 1151. The Town of Union had
enacted an ordinance that prohibited a private company from accepting for disposal any waste
that "originates, or is collected, or is in any way gathered or assembled from outside the Town of
Union." Id. at 1150 (internal citation omitted).
108. Id. at 1151 (quoting Tisei v. Town of Ogunquit, 491 A.2d 564, 570 (Me. 1985)).
109. Id. (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1302 (West Supp. 1986)).
110. Sawyer Envtl. Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden, 2000 ME 179, 33-34,
760 A.2d at 265-66.
111. Id. 18, 760 A.2d at 259.
112. Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 13 10-S(3) (West 2001). The sections states:
Automatic municipal intervenor status. The municipal officers, or their designees,
from the municipality in which the facility would be located have intervenor status if
they request it within 60 days of notification under subsection 1. The intervenor
status granted under this subsection applies in any proceeding for a license under this
article. Immediately upon the commissioner's receipt of such a request, the interve-
nors have all rights and responsibilities commensurate with this status.
Id.
113. Sawyer Envtl. Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden, 2000 ME 179, 32, 760
A.2d at 265 ("It would make little sense for the Legislature to craft this process for expansion
approval and include express provision for significant local participation, then after approval,
allow the municipality to negate the proceedings and prohibit the expansion."). The court's
determination was not simply based upon common sense, but the statutory standard of preemp-
tion contained in the Home Rule enabling legislation. Id. ("Such an after the fact and absolute
prohibition of the expansion prevents the 'efficient accomplishment' of the 'defined state pur-
pose' of proper management of expansion of solid waste disposal facilities."); see supra note 52
and accompanying text (providing the standard of preemption); see also infra note 119 and
accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the Solid Waste Management Act).
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ated rules. 114 The court stated that the prohibition of stricter standards "necessar-
ily bars" Hampden's attempt to prohibit the expansion altogether. 115
III. SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT
The Maine Legislature enacted the Solid Waste Management Act in 1973.116
The enactment followed closely upon the heels of the federal government's enact-
ment of the Clean Water Act in 1972.117 As currently codified, the stated congres-
sional purpose of the Clean Water Act is to restore and protect the nation's water
from various forms of pollution. 118 Similarly, the Maine Solid Waste Manage-
ment Act was enacted to establish a statewide program to address the problems of
pollution, and in the current form focuses not only on water pollution, but also
land and air pollution. 119 In its declaration of policy, the Legislature further stated
its finding that statewide legislation was necessary to address the problems of pol-
lution because municipalities had not, and, due to the structure of local govern-
114. Sawyer Envtl. Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden, 2000 ME 179, 31, 760
A.2d at 265; see also tit. 38, § 1310-U. The section states in relevant part:
Municipalities are prohibited from enacting stricter standards than those contained in
this chapter and in the solid waste management rules adopted pursuant to this chapter
governing the hydrogeological criteria for siting or designing solid waste disposal
facilities or governing the engineering criteria related to waste handling and disposal
areas of a solid waste disposal facility.... Under the municipal home rule authority
granted by the Constitution of Maine, Article VIII, Part Second and Title 30-A, sec-
tion 3001, municipalities, except as provided in this section, may enact ordinances
with respect to solid waste facilities that contain standards the municipality finds
reasonable, including, without limitation, conformance with federal and state solid
waste rules; fire safety; traffic safety; levels of noise heard outside the facility; dis-
tance from existing residential, commercial or institutional uses; ground water pro-
tection; surface water protection; erosion and sedimentation control; and compatibil-
ity of the solid waste facility with local zoning and land use controls, provided that
the standards are not more strict than those contained in this chapter and in chapter 3,
subchapter I, articles 5-A and 6 and the rules adopted under these articles. Municipal
ordinances must use definitions consistent with those adopted by the board.
Id. (emphasis added).
115. Sawyer Envtl. Recovery Facilities, Inc. v. Town of Hampden, Inc., 2000 ME 179, 31,
760 A.2d at 265.
116. Solid Waste Management Act, Pub. L. No. 1973, c. 387 (codified as amended at tit. 38,
§§ 1301 to 1319-Y).
117. Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004)).
118. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (West 2001).
119. Title 38, § 1302. The section provides in part:
For the purposes of this chapter ... the Legislature finds and declares it to be the
policy of the State, consistent with its duty to protect the health, safety and welfare of
its citizens, enhance and maintain the quality of the environment, conserve natural
resources and prevent air, water and land pollution, to establish a coordinated state-
wide waste reduction, recycling and management program.
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of the State to pursue and
implement an integrated approach to hazardous and solid waste management, which
shall be based on the following priorities: reduction of waste generated at the source,
including both the amount and toxicity of waste; waste reuse; waste recycling; waste
composting; waste processing which reduces the volume of waste needing disposal,
including waste-to-energy technology; and land disposal.
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ment, potentially could not have, adequately addressed the issues themselves. 120
Finally, the Legislature found "that environmentally suitable sites for waste dis-
posal are in limited supply and represent a critical natural resource," and the provi-
sions of the Act should be liberally construed to "accomplish the policies in this
section." 12 1
The statute directly addresses the role and authority of municipalities in the
effort to reduce and recycle, as well as to protect the health of the citizens and the
environment. 122 Each municipality is required to provide for the disposal of both
solid waste and septic waste generated within that municipality. 123 In addition to
requiring each municipality to provide for the disposal of septic waste, the statute
states that "any person may provide a site for disposal of septage.' 124 In establish-
ing a site for septage disposal, such a person must receive approval from the State
Department of Environmental Protection and the municipality. 125 In the process
of evaluating the application, the municipality may consider the proposed location's
compliance with municipal ordinances, zoning and land use controls. 126 If there
is no conflict between the proposed location of the private site and such municipal
ordinances, then the municipality is required to approve the application. 12 7
Significant to analysis of the Solid Waste Management Act, as with any statu-
tory compilation, and of particular importance in the Smith case are the statutory
definitions. Section 1303-C(29) defines "solid waste" and provides a non-exhaus-
tive list of substances included in the definition. 128 More significant to the Smith
120. Id. Section 1302 provides, in part:
The Legislature further finds that needed municipal waste recycling and disposal fa-
cilities have not been developed in a timely and environmentally sound manner be-
cause of diffused responsibility for municipal waste planning, processing and dis-
posal among numerous and overlapping units of local government. The Legislature
also finds that direct state action is needed to assist municipalities in separating, col-
lecting, recycling and disposing of solid waste, and that sound environmental policy
and economics of scale dictate a preference for public solid waste management plan-
ning and implementation on a regional and state level.
121. Id.
122. See id. § 1305.
123. Id. §§ 1305(1), 1305(6). Section 1305(1) states: "Disposal services. Each municipality
shall provide solid waste disposal services for domestic and commercial solid waste generated
within the municipality .. " Id. § 1305(1). Section 1305(6) states in part: "Municipal septage
sites. Each municipality shall provide for the disposal of all refuse, effluent, sludge and any
other materials from all septic tanks and cesspools located within the municipality." Id. § 1305(6).
124. Id. § 1305(6). The section provides in relevant part:
In addition, any person may provide a site for disposal of septage. In addition to
making application to the Department of Environmental Protection for approval of
any site, that person shall have written approval for the site location from the munici-
pality in which it is located .... A municipality may determine whether approval of
the site must be obtained first from the department or the municipality. The munici-
pal officers shall approve, after hearing, any such private site if they find that the site





128. Id. § 1303-C(29). Section 1303-C(29) defines "solid waste" as "useless, unwanted or
discarded solid material with insufficient liquid content to be free-flowing, including, but not
limited to, rubbish, garbage, refuse-derived fuel, scrap materials, junk, refuse, inert fill material
and landscape refuse, but does not include hazardous waste, biomedical waste, septage or agri-
cultural wastes." Id.
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case and the incumbent preemption analysis, is the list of substances that are not
incorporated by the definition, which includes "septage." 129 Of related signifi-
cance are sections 1310-S and 1310-U. Both sections are included in Article HI of
Title 38 addressing "Solid Waste Facility Siting."'130 Section 1310-S discussed
earlier in the context of Sawyer Environmental Recovery Facilities, Inc., addresses
local participation, including municipal intervenor status. 131 Section 1310-U, also
discussed in the context of Sawyer Environmental Recovery Facilities, Inc., ad-
dresses the role of municipal ordinances in the establishment and siting of solid
waste facilities. 132 The crux of section 1310-U is that municipalities are prohib-
ited from enacting stricter standards than the state has established through its statu-
tory scheme. 13 3
IV. SMITH V. TOWN OF PIT1STON
In Smith v. Town of Pittston, Jerald Smith filed a complaint against the Town
claiming that its septage ordinance, which prohibited the dumping of septage ab-
sent approval by a vote of the citizens, was illegal. 134 The claim was based upon
the language and intent of the Solid Waste Management Act, whereby Smith ar-
gued that the state, through its statutory scheme, had preempted municipal author-
ity to prohibit his creation of a private site. 135 The Superior Court (Kennebec
County, Marden, J.) held that municipal ordinances, such as Pittston's, are pre-
empted by the state statutory scheme. 136 On appeal, the Law Court vacated the
judgment of the Superior Court and remanded the case for judgment in favor of the
Town of Pittston. 137 Three members of the court dissented from the majority,
arguing that municipal authority, to the extent exercised by Pittston, was preempted
by the Legislature's enactment of the Solid Waste Management Act. 138
In April of 1999, Smith first sought permission before Pittston's municipal
officers to spread septage on a privately owned site in the town. 139 As directed by
the municipal officers, Smith began the process of applying for a permit for his
proposed business. 140 On July 2 8 th of that year, the citizens of Pittston approved
129. Septage is defined as: "[W]aste, refuse, effluent, sludge and any other materials from
septic tanks, cesspools or any other similar facilities." Id. § 1303-C(27).
130. See id. §§ 1310-N to 1310-AA.
131. Id. § 1310-S; see also supra note 112 and accompanying text.
132. Title 38, § 1310-U; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
133. See id., § 1310-U.
134. Smith v. Town of Pittston, 2003 ME 46, IN 5, 13, 820 A.2d 1200, 1202-03.
135. Smith v. Town of Pittston, No. Civ.A. CV-99-279, 2002 WL 273634, at *2 (Me. Super.).
Although Smith's complaint consisted of twelve counts, it is Count IX, addressing the legality
of Pittston's ordinance that was at the center of the courts' analyses and is the focal point of this
article. See id. at * 1; see also Smith v. Town of Pittston, 2003 ME 46, I 13-16, 22, 820 A.2d at
1203, 1205. "At the center of this dispute lies section t305(6) [of the Solid Waste Management
Act], detailing municipal powers and duties in regulating and providing for the disposal of
septage." Id. 22, 820 A.2d at 1205.
136. Smith v. Town of Pittson, 2002 WL 273634, at *3 ("Clearly, the Town of Pittston has
'frustrated the purpose' of state regulation in this area by prohibiting all forms of septage spreading
within its confines .... Accordingly, this court finds that the Town of Pittston has exceeded its
home rule authority by passing an ordinance prohibiting the spreading ... of septage.").
137. Smith v. Town of Pittson, 2003 ME 46, 38, 820 A.2d at 1210.
138. Id. 1 39, 820A.2d at 1210.
139. Id. 2, 820 A.2d at 1201.
140. Id. J 2, 820 A.2d at 1201-02.
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a 180-day moratorium on the spreading of septage within the municipal borders. 14 1
Due to the existence of the moratorium, the municipal officers declined to submit
Smith's application for review by the State Department of Environmental Protec-
tion (DEP) on August 4.142 At a town meeting on December 22, 1999, the citizens
of Pittston approved an ordinance that "prohibited the 'spreading, storing, or dump-
ing of septage in the Town of Pittston' unless approved by the voters of the Town
of Pittston." t 43 The same day, Smith's spreading application was forwarded to the
DEP for review. 144 The application was not fully reviewed by the DEP because it
was deemed incomplete, but was forwarded again on February 2, 2000.145 On
October 19, 2000, Pittston's voters approved a third version of the septage spread-
ing ordinance that made the effective date retroactive to July 23, 1999.146 On May
15, 2001, the DEP approved Smith's application and granted a license to spread
septage on his Pittston property. 147 When the Town refused to approve the site
and grant Smith a permit, this legal action ensued. 148
In their opinion upholding the ordinance, the majority of the court began their
analysis with the policy and purpose of the Solid Waste Management Act. 149 The
court noted the need for statewide coordination of disposal and recycling efforts,
and reiterated the Legislature's determination that the Act should be "'construed
liberally to address the findings and accomplish the policies [of section 1302I."'150
Completing its discussion of the statutory background, the court provided the rel-
evant statutory definitions and noted the DEP authority in the approval process.151
The court began its discussion of preemption by examining section 1305(6) of the
Solid Waste Management Act. 152 As was discussed previously in this article, sec-
tion 1305(6) requires municipalities to provide for the disposal of septage, and
further that any individual may provide a site. 153 The section also addresses the
method for approval of a proposed private site. 1 54 Before moving on to discuss
home rule authority and the standards for preemption, the court noted the exist-
ence of section 1310-U prohibiting municipalities from enacting stricter standards
than has the state in regulating solid waste disposal.1 55
141. Id. 4, 820 A.2d at 1202.
142. Id.
143. Id. (H 5, 7, 820 A.2d at 1202.
144. Id. 7, 820 A.2d at 1202.
145. Id. 8, 820 A.2d at 1202.
146. Id. 10, 820 A.2d at 1203. The second ordinance had been adopted on March 18, 2000
and along with the first version was removed and replaced by the third and final version adopted
on October 19. Id. U 9-10, 820A.2d at 1202-03.
147. Id. 11, 820 A.2d at 1203.
148. Id. H 12-13, 820 A.2d at 1203.
149. Id. 20, 820 A.2d at 1204.
150. Id. (quoting ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1302 (West 2001)). See also supra note 119
and the accompanying text relating to the discussion of section 1302.
151. Smith v. Town of Pittson, 2003 ME 46, 1 21, 820 A.2d at 1204-05. See supra notes 128-
29 and accompanying text for the language of the relevant definitions and the related discussion.
152. Smith v. Town of Pittson, 2003 ME 46, T 22, 820 A.2d at 1205-06.
153. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1305(6) (West 2001); see also supra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text.
154. Title 38, § 1305(6).
155. Id. § 1310-U; see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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Having laid out the relevant portions of the Solid Waste Management Act, the
court turned to home rule and the standards for preemption. 156 The court recog-
nized that a municipality may exercise any authority not explicitly or implicitly
denied by the state, noted the presumption in favor of municipal authority, and
stated that "[t]he determinative factor is, therefore, whether the ordinance 'would
frustrate the purpose of any state law."" 157 Accordingly, the appropriate standard
was stated in the terms of "[w]e will view municipal action as preempted only
when the application of the 'municipal ordinance prevents the efficient accom-
plishment of a defined state purpose.' ' ' 158
While recognizing that it had previously held in both Midcoast Disposal and
Sawyer Environmental Recovery Facilities, Inc. that the Solid Waste Management
Act preempted municipal ordinances banning solid waste disposal, the court dis-
tinguished these cases on the ground that septage is treated differently than solid
waste. 159 Specifically, the court held that section 1305(6) "clearly contemplates"
municipal involvement in the licensing process, which makes its approach differ-
ent than that for solid waste provided in section 13 10-U. 16 0 The existence and
structure of section 1310-U was seen as unambiguous evidence that the Legisla-
ture was competent to preempt municipal authority when it chose to, and the inclu-
sion of only solid waste within section 1310-U confirmed an intentionally differ-
ent approach to septage. 161 Furthermore, Pittston had met the state's general re-
quirement that it provide for the safe and effective disposal of septage by contract-
ing with Interstate Septic Systems in a manner approved by the DEP.162 Finally,
the majority stated that Smith's argument was weakened because the ordinance
did not in fact prohibit private septage disposal, but only spreading or land appli-
cation. 163 The court noted that other methods of disposal permissible under the
DEP regulations were still available to Smith and any other potential private appli-
cant, and therefore the state's purposes were not frustrated. 164
While the dissenting justices undertook the same analysis, they reached the
opposite conclusion-that Pittston's ordinance was preempted by the Solid Waste
Management Act. 16 5 The majority's conclusion that not all methods of disposal
available to private applicants were foreclosed by Pittston's ordinance drew an
incredulous response from the dissent. 166 In the dissent's view, the alternate meth-
ods suggested by the majority, while in some technical sense may have been avail-
able, were utterly unrealistic in application. 167 The dissent concluded that Pittston's
156. Smith v. Town of Pittson, 2003 ME 46, 24, 820 A.2d at 1206.
157. Id. (quoting Sch. Comm. of York v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935, 939 (Me. 1993)); see
also ME. Rnv. STAT. ArN. tit. 30-A, § 3001 (West 1996); supra text accompanying note 52.
158. Smith v. Town of Pittson, 2003 ME 46, 1 24, 820 A.2d at 1206 (quoting Sch. Comm. of
York v. Town of York, 626 A.2d 935, 938 n.8 (Me. 1993)).
159. Id. 29-30, 820 A.2d at 1207-08.
160. Id. 29, 820 A.2d at 1207.
161. Id. 29, 820 A.2d at 1208.
162. Id. 29, 820 A.2d at 1207-08.
163. Id. 31,820 A.2d at 1208.
164. Id.
165. Id. 1 39, 820 A.2d at 1210 (Dana, J., dissenting).
166. Id. 1 41, 820 A.2d at 1211 (Dana, J., dissenting) ("To be charitable, the Court's sugges-
tion that Smith could build a private wastewater treatment facility is, at least, impractical.").
167. Id. 41-42, 820 A.2d at 1211-12 (Dana, J., dissenting).
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ordinance frustrated the Legislature's purpose in enacting statewide regulation,
and therefore, it was invalid. 16 8
V. ANALYSIS
The complexity of the issue presented is demonstrated by the fact that the
majority and dissenting justices undertook the same analysis and yet reached op-
posite conclusions. Compelling and opposing legislative policies accompanied by
limited legislative guidance has left the courts to do the heavy lifting in the domain
of implied preemption. Both the majority and the dissent took a practical and
legitimate approach to the issue, and based on the law and precedent, both achieved
a reasonable conclusion.1 69 However, based upon the statutory structure of both
the Solid Waste Management Act and the home rule enabling legislation, and ac-
cepted models of statutory construction, the majority had the better of the argu-
ment. Moreover, prudential considerations surrounding the significance and im-
portance of municipal home rule counsel against preemption. The court's analysis
of the issues and hesitancy to recognize implied preemption is grander than the
issue of whether Mr. Smith could spread septage on his property in Pittston. In
cases of implied preemption the entire scheme of municipal home rule is at risk of
being undermined. Home rule is of extreme importance, not only to municipali-
ties, but also to the local citizenship and the state government. The importance of
home rule calls for a legislative determination of preemption rather than a judicial
one; requiring a legislative determination keeps the courts and the democratic pro-
cess operating within the realms to which they were designed and are best-suited.
A. Statutory Construction
General rules of statutory construction are instructive in the implied preemp-
tion analysis. To begin with, the point of interpreting a statute is to fulfil the intent
of the Legislature; that is always the objective. t 70 Furthermore, a significant part
of the intent is effectuating the policy supporting that intended objective. 17 1 The
168, Id. 1 43, 820 A.2d at 1212 (Dana, J., dissenting). Justice Dana stated that:
The Legislature spoke clearly when it declared the policy behind the waste manage-
ment statute. Recognizing that "environmentally suitable sites for waste disposal are
in limited supply and represent a critical natural resource" and that "municipal waste
recycling and disposal facilities have not been developed in a timely and environmen-
tally sound manner because of diffused responsibility for municipal waste planning,
processing and disposal among numerous and overlapping units of local government,"
the Legislature provided that "any person may provide a site for disposal of septage."
.. Pittston has thwarted the Legislature's intent to foster the creation of adequate,
affordable, environmentally suitable, private septage disposal sites. Its ordinance is,
therefore, ultra vires.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
169. The same can be said for Justice Marden of the Superior Court.
170. See Schwanda v. Bonney, 418 A.2d 163, 165-66 (Me. 1980) ("Legislative intendment
always controls; this is a fundamental precept of statutory construction."); see also Chase v.
Town of Litchfield, 134 Me. 122, 128, 182 A. 921, 924 (1936) ("The intention of the lawmaker
is the law.") (citation omitted).
171. Schwanda v. Bonney, 418 A.2d at 166 ("Courts should implement not only the intent but
also the policy of the Legislature behind the legislation.").
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Law Court has stated that legislative history and legislative activity are useful in-
struments to be considered in the process of ascertaining legislative intent. 172 A
corollary to achieving the legislative intent is the plain meaning rule, or in other
words, applying the plain or common meaning to the language in order to best
represent the legislative intent. 173 Additionally, and of particular importance in
such an extensive statutory scheme as the Solid Waste Management Act, is the rule
that every portion of the legislation be afforded meaning. 174 What this rule of
construction means is that no one section will be construed in such a manner that it
negates another section or makes another section obsolete. 175
Section 1302 of the Solid Waste Management Act declares the need for state-
wide coordination to address the environmental issues and the scarcity of suitable
waste disposal sites. 176 The ultimate goal expressed by the Legislature is "to pro-
tect the health, safety and welfare of [Maine's] citizens, enhance and maintain the
quality of the environment, conserve natural resources and prevent air, water and
land pollution." 177 In order to achieve that objective, the Legislature declares that
the provisions of the Act should be liberally construed. 178 In implementing the
state's policy, the statute requires municipalities to provide for the disposal of solid
waste and septage produced within the municipal boundaries. 17 9 That require-
ment must be read in light of the overall purpose of the statute-protecting the
health of the citizenry and the environment. Similarly, the provision's allowance
for private septage disposal sites can be linked to the finding that "environmen-
tally suitable sites for waste disposal are in limited supply and represent a critical
natural resource." 180
As with the Solid Waste Management Act, the Legislature has provided that
the home rule enabling legislation should be liberally construed to give effect to its
purposes. 181 The purpose to be given effect is the enhancement of "the welfare of
the municipalities and their inhabitants." 182 The breadth of municipal authority is
demonstrated by its limitations, which are found only in express denial of author-
172. Id. ("The legislative history of a particular statute, as well as legislative activity con-
cerning such or related legislation, is a helpful guide in ascertaining the intent of the Legisla-
ture."). The court has demonstrated a willingness to take its own advice and use legislative
history in construing the intent of a statute. See, e.g., Seh. Comm. of York v. Town of York, 626
A.2d 935, 938 n.8 (Me. 1993) (after stating the Legislature's intent, the court supported its
conclusion by quoting a portion of the relevant Committee Report relating to the amending of
the home rule scheme).
173. See Hallissey v. Sch. Admin. Dist. Number 77,2003 ME 143, 14,755 A.2d 1068, 1073
("When construing a statute, 'we look to the plain meaning of the language to give effect to the
legislative intent."') (quoting Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 1999 ME
170, 7, 740 A.2d 584, 587).
174. See Cent. Me. Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon, 571 A.2d 1189, 1194 (Me. 1990).
175. id. ("'[W]henever possible, courts will construe a legislative scheme so as to render no
portion of it useless or unnecessary."') (alteration in original) (quoting Ullis v. Town of Boothbay
Harbor, 459 A.2d 153, 159 (Me. 1983)).
176. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1302 (West 2001).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. §§ 1305(1), 1305(6).
180. Id. § 1302.
181. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, § 3001(1) (West 1996 & Supp. 2003).
182. Id.
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ity or denial by clear implication. 183 In order for implicit denial of authority to be
established, the municipal ordinance must "frustrate the purpose of any state law."184
Implied preemption has been found to exist when a municipality attempted to add
an additional requirement to that required by the state for the issuance of a con-
cealed weapons permit. 185 Similarly, the Town of Brewer was preempted from
regulating an automobile junkyard in a manner beyond the scope of the state statu-
tory scheme. 186 Likewise, the court has invalidated, on preemption grounds, a
municipal ordinance that sought to impose additional requirements in order to re-
ceive a liquor license. 1 87 In the words of the court, such ordinances work at "cross
purposes" to the state's enacted scheme. 18 8 However, a local ordinance that re-
quires a more stringent review or analysis in a manner that furthers the purpose of
the state scheme is not implicitly preempted. 189
The statutory requirement that municipal home rule be liberally construed
reflects the Legislature's intent that towns be given broad authority to control local
issues. Furthermore, that authority is accompanied by a presumption of valid-
ity. 190 The stated purpose of promoting the welfare of municipalities and their
inhabitants is buttressed by the words of the Intergovernmental Relations
Commission's report, which states: "The establishment of Municipal Home Rule
creates a local government that must be responsible to the people it governs. If it
is not responsible to the local community, then the local government will no longer
be in office."'19 1 As long as the municipal ordinance does not frustrate the purpose
of a state law it will be upheld. 192 It is against this backdrop that the Solid Waste
Management Act, and Pittston's authority must be analyzed.
As has been discussed, section 1305(6) of the Solid Waste Management Act
requires each municipality to provide for disposal of septage produced within its
borders. The same section provides that in addition to the municipality's obliga-
tion, any individual "may provide a site for disposal of septage." 193 Based upon
the language, it is clear that there is no obligation upon such an individual as there
is for the municipality. 194 Before a private site can be utilized, the individual must
183. Id. § 3001.
184. Id. § 3001(3).
185. See Schwanda v. Bonney, 418 A.2d 163, 167 (Me. 1980).
186. See Spain v. City of Brewer, 474A.2d 496, 500 (Me. 1984) (noting that "lain analysis of
this entire statutory scheme reveals a clear legislative intent to limit the inquiry in automobile
graveyard and junkyard permitting proceedings to evidence concerning the location of the facil-
ity with reference to a highway and compliance with screening regulations.")
187. See Ullis v. Inhabitants of Boothbay Harbor, 459 A.2d 153, 155 (Me. 1983).
188. Id. at 159.
189. See Cent. Maine Power Co. v. Town of Lebanon, 571 A.2d 1189 (Me. 1990). "By
requiring a more stringent review process for certain types of pesticide use than that found in the
two Maine pesticide acts, the Lebanon ordinance shares and advances these same purposes." Id.
at 1195.
190. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
191. MAINE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON HOME RULE 1 (1968).
192. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
193. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1305(6) (West 2001).
194. Although the term "may" utilized in a statutory context is generally considered to be
permissive, it has been interpreted as mandatory when imposing a public duty. Schwanda v.
Bonney, 418 A.2d 163, 167 (Me. 1980). However, interpreting section 1305(6) to place a duty
upon private persons to provide for septage disposal is untenable. See tit. 38, § 1305(6).
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get approval from the DEP and the municipality. 195 In the case of private septage
disposal, the legislative intent, and accordingly the scope of the municipality's
role, can be distinguished from the municipality's role in the solid waste context.
Section 1305(6) provides that "the municipal officers shall approve, after hearing,
any such private site if they find the site complies with municipal ordinances and
with local zoning and land use controls." 1 96 A plain reading of the statute necessi-
tates the conclusion that a municipality does have authority to accept or reject an
application, but only upon the bases provided in the statute. Should the site com-
ply with local ordinances, zoning, and land use controls, then the municipality
must approve the application. The plain meaning is confirmed by an examination
of other relevant factors.
As was discussed in the context of Sawyer Environmental Recovery Facili-
ties, Inc., section 1310-S grants a municipality intervenor status when an applica-
tion for a solid waste disposal facility license is filed with the DE. 197 As the court
in Sawyer noted, intervenor status is not commensurate with an authority to pro-
hibit a solid waste disposal facility entirely. However, it is noteworthy that section
1305(6) does not grant intervenor status, but makes municipal approval a prereq-
uisite for a private site. 198 The granting of intervenor status on the one hand, and
the requirement of written approval on the other, reflects a different policy relating
to the scope of municipal involvement. Furthermore, section 1310-U, also relied
upon by the court in Sawyer, prohibits municipalities from enacting stricter siting
standards, but does so only in the context of "solid waste."'199 It could be argued
that the policy behind section 1310 -U applied to septage as well as to solid waste,
but the structure of the statutory scheme and recent legislative activity belie that
argument. Both sections 1310-S and 1310-U fall under the heading of "Solid Waste
Facility Siting." 200 Furthermore, the specific exclusion of "septage" from the statu-
tory definition of "solid waste" 20 1 was pursuant to an amendment passed in 2001.202
As the court has stated, such legislative activity is informative of legislative intent;
the Legislature's removal of septage from the definition, absent any accompany-
ing amendment to section 1310-U, creates an inference that the section's applica-
tion was intended to be confined to solid waste.
Moreover, section 1305(6) grants the municipality authority to "determine
whether approval of the [private] site must be obtained first from the department
or the municipality." 203 Applying the rules of statutory construction it follows
that such a discretionary grant to the municipality must not be empty words. If the
scope of municipal authority in approving an application for a private septage dis-
195. Title 38, § 1305(6) ("In addition to making application to the Department of Environ-
mental Protection for approval of any site, that person shall have written approval for the site
location from the municipality in which it is located ... .
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. Id. § 1310-S(3).
198. For a discussion of the scope of authority commensurate with intervenor status, see
Butler v. D/Wave Seafood, 2002 ME 41, 1 13, 791 A.2d 928, 931 (quoting Local Number 93 v.
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528-29 (1986)).
199. Title 38, § 1310-U.
200. See tit. 38, §§ 1310-N-1310-AA.
201. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
202. P.L. 2001, c. 247, §1.
203. Title 38, § 1305(6).
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posal site is as narrow as the Smith dissent argues, then the ability to determine
whether approval may come first from the municipality or the department is obso-
lete. No benefit could possibly be derived from such discretion if the underlying
authority was essentially nonexistent.
Finally, the purpose of the Solid Waste Management Act is not frustrated by
permitting municipalities to prohibit private septage disposal sites. To protect the
health and welfare of its citizens and the environment, the Legislature sought to
establish a coordinated and integrated approach to waste disposal through the Solid
Waste Management Act.204 One of the means employed to accomplish this pur-
pose, was requiring each municipality to properly dispose of the septage produced
within its boundaries. The record in the Smith case demonstrates that Pittston has
satisfied that requirement.205 An additional purpose of the state was to act in a
manner that recognized that "environmentally suitable sites for waste disposal are
in limited supply and represent a critical natural resource."'206 Although the con-
text of this legislative finding leads to the conclusion that it is related to the en-
couragement of recycling and reuse,207 interpreting it more broadly, as the dissent
in Smith appears to have done, does not convert Pittston's ordinance into a frustra-
tion of the state's purpose. There is nothing in the record that indicates that Pittston
has not met its obligations to protect its citizens and the environment. Permitting
Mr. Smith to spread septage on his property may very well have contributed to the
Solid Waste Management Act's purpose, but prohibiting the same does not frus-
trate it; rather, it requires Pittston to satisfy its obligations through other means,
which it has done. Furthermore, the ordinance would have been valid even if it
had prohibited all methods of disposal rather than just spreading. 208
B. Significance of Home Rule
In contrast with the Solid Waste Management Act, the Legislature's purpose
in granting municipal home rule would have been frustrated by a judicial finding
that Pittston's authority had been implicitly preempted. As was discussed in Part
II(B)(l) above, the Legislature intended municipal home rule to establish a sub-
stantial degree of municipal independence and accountability to the local citi-
zenry. 209 To facilitate the accomplishment of that purpose, the requirement that
home rule be broadly construed was included in the statute.2 10 Reflecting the
legislative intent is the sweeping language of the Intergovernmental Relations
Commission's report:
204. See id. § 1302; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
205. Smith v. Town of Pittston, 2003 ME 46,1 29, 820A.2d 1200, 1208 ("The record reflects
that the Town of Pittston has provided for the disposal of septage by virtue of its contract with
Interstate Septic Systems and that DEP has certified that the Town's contract satisfies the re-
quirements of section 1305(6).").
206. Title 38, § 1305(6).
207. See id.
208. The majority in Smith stated that "[i]f the Town's ordinance prohibited all methods of
septage disposal, Smith would have a stronger argument that the purposes of section 1305(6) are
frustrated." Smith v. Town of Pittson, 2003 ME 46, 31, 820 A.2d at 1208. However, the
statutory interpretation, as previously discussed, and more importantly the policy behind the
home rule legislation, warrant a broader reading of municipal authority.
209. See supra notes 38-56 and accompanying text.
210. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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Home Rule accomplishes the basic philosophy of government in allowing the
people most directly affected by the governing body, to rule the governing body.
Whether it be municipal, state or federal, the United States has been a country
whereby "no taxation without representation" has been the motto. The establish-
ment of Municipal Home Rule creates a local government that must be respon-
sible to the people it governs.2 11
Had the court preempted municipal authority, the ramifications would have been
far-reaching. For example, an individual could decide he wanted to establish a
private site for the disposal of septage, and as long as the DEP approved, there
would be nothing that the municipality could do to prevent the disposal. This
would be true regardless of the location of the site2 12 or what percentage of the
town's citizenship was opposed to the location. Borrowing the words of another
commentator, "[a]dherence to [that] interpretation will result in the end of mean-
ingful home rule in Maine." 2 13 Moreover, from an environmental standpoint, other
commentators have stated that "[ilncreased participation by local government in
the environmental arena can enhance environmental protection by tailoring fed-
eral and state programs to fit local needs and concerns.... [Miunicipalities have
a legitimate role in evaluating federal and state policies in the light of the environ-
mental and social conditions in their area."'2 14
C. The Role of the Legislature vs. the Role of the Judiciary
Although the court in Smith v. Town of Pittston got the answer right, whether
or not the state has preempted municipal home rule authority should not be left to
judicial determination, but rather to the Legislature. By explicitly preempting cer-
tain fields of authority 2 15 the Legislature has demonstrated that it is capable of
making such determinations. Rather than create an amorphous sphere of implied
preemption, the Legislature should explicitly preempt any field it desires to pre-
empt.2 16 The court's approach in implied preemption cases, as demonstrated in
211. MAINE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON HOME RULE 1 (1968).
212. One could imagine any number of scenarios, particularly in rural communities, such as
spreading septage on property adjacent to a school, which would illicit genuine and warranted
concern from local officials. If municipal home rule were preempted, the hands of local offi-
cials would be effectively tied and they would have no means to address the concerns of their
constituents.
213. Bower, supra note 10, at 364.
214. Ellen Z. Harrison & Malaika M. Eaton, The Role of Municipalities in Regulating the
Land Application of Sewage Sludges and Septage, 41 NAT. REsoucEs J. 77, 80-81 (2001) (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
215. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2011(1) (West Supp. 2003). Section 2011(1)
provides that "Itihe State intends to occupy and preempt the entire field of legislation concern-
ing the regulation of firearms, components, ammunition and supplies. Except as provided in
subsection 3, any existing or future order, ordinance, rule or regulation in this field of any politi-
cal subdivision of the State is void." Id.
216. See Christy Noel, Preemption Hogwash: North Carolina's Judicial Repeal of Local
Authority to Regulate Hog Farms in Craig v. County of Chatham, 80 N.C. L. REV. 2121 (2002).
Noel notes that:
The North Carolina Supreme Court's preemption ruling in Craig v. County of Chatham
contributes to already clouded precedent defining state and local authority. The Gen-
eral Assembly should act decisively in its next session to clarify the law regarding the
scope of local government authority concerning North Carolina's economic and envi-
ronmental animal waste crises. Hereinafter, state courts should apply preemption
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Smith, supports this argument. When a court interprets a statutory scheme in order
to determine whether or not the Legislature has implicitly preempted municipal
home rule, it looks first and foremost to the legislative intent of the statute.2 17
Consequently, the court either finds that there is, or is not, implicit preemption
based on its perception of the intent of the Legislature. 2 18 Once a court makes
such a determination, there is a lasting impact due to judicial precedence and stare
decisis.2 19 However, it is the Legislature that is in the best position to know its
own intent. Rather than force a court to struggle through statutory interpretation
of competing statutory schemes, the Legislature should simply state its intent, and
if it desires to preempt municipal authority do so explicitly. Furthermore, requir-
ing explicit preemption will escape the potential pitfall of the courts creating au-
thoritative precedence based on a misinterpretation of legislative intent. The state
has made it clear that municipal home rule is important; accordingly, preemption
of local authority is best left to the democratic process.
Moreover, the significance of the environmental concerns addressed by the
Solid Waste Management Act warrant a legislative determination. The Act was
enacted during an era of increasing environmental awareness. While much has
been accomplished in the effort to protect the environment over the last thirty
principles carefully and consistently, toward the goals of avoiding confusion and pro-
moting sound public policy.
Id. at 2130; see also George D. Vaubel, Toward Principles of State Restraint Upon the Exercise
of Municipal Power in Home Rule, 22 STETSON L. REv. 643 (1993). Vaubel states that:
The most serious difficulty courts face [in cases of implied preemption] is that the
search for legislative intent is nebulous at best. More often than not, a legislature in
enacting a law has no intent at all with respect to superseding municipal regulations.
Rather, legislatures usually act to solve affirmatively a particular problem and not to
change municipal law. Thus, although rarely admitted by the courts, determining
preemption is often an exercise of judicial judgment in the absence of a legislative
one. With legislative correction of any judicial misstep likely to be slow and cumber-
some, the ultimate effect of a preemption decision is to assert judicial control-in
effect, expanded judicial home rule. Unfortunately, a search for legislative intent
impedes clarity as well. It produces unpredictable results because of the difficulty
courts face in applying a clear set of guidelines for determining supposed legislative
intent.
In light of these circumstances, it is not surprising that observers have singled
out implied preemption for vehement criticism. They have... described it as a threat
to home rule.... Critics further contend either that implied preemption is an unwork-
able rule that courts should abandon or that it should be applied cautiously. They
should act only if the basis for finding preemption is clear, i.e., they should resolve
doubts as to legislative intent in favor of municipal power.
Id. at 684-86 (internal citations omitted).
217. See supra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Smith v. Town of Pittston, 2003 ME 46, 820 A.2d 1200.
219. Stare decisis is defined as the doctrine of: "abid[ing] by, or adher[ing] to, decided
cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). It is true that the Intergovernmental
Relations Commission anticipated, and in fact encouraged, judicial involvement, but that seems
to have been in the context of municipal charter amendments. See MAINE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS COMMISSION, REPORT ON HOME RULE 2 (1968). Unlike judicial interpretation of appro-
priate home rule procedure relating to charter amendments, the judicial interpretation of implied
preemption will not work to create stability because the court is required to make its best guess
relating to the Legislature's intent and will be unable to establish bright line rules that will serve
as effective notice to local governing authorities and citizens. See id The sharply divided court
in Smith demonstrates the potential problems.
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years, environmental concerns are still substantial and varied.2 20 Accordingly, the
question of preemption should be answered by the Legislature. It is clear from
Smith that municipal authority and environmental protection can be competing
interests. The state has sought to address both interests through comprehensive
statutory schemes that require an expansive interpretation to effect the underlying
purposes. 22 1 Thus, which interest is more compelling is a determination that should
be addressed by the same governmental entity that enacted those statutory schemes:
the Legislature. The ramifications of ajudicial determination like the one in Smith
v. Town of Pittston are far-reaching and impact the accomplishment of two impor-
tant state objectives. It is not in the best interest of the citizens of Maine to have
the fate of municipal home rule on the one hand and environmental protection on
the other turn on a judicial analysis of statutory construction with such limited
legislative guidance.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Smith v. Town of Pittston, the Law Court was called upon to interpret the
interplay of two somewhat competing statutory schemes. Employing a traditional
statutory construction approach, the court, by a one vote margin, answered the
question appropriately. Although the court's decision was obviously significant to
both parties to the case, it had a more significant impact by preserving municipal
home rule. The intent of the state Legislature, as evidenced by Article VIII of the
Maine Constitution and the accompanying statutory enabling legislation, is that
municipalities have extensive authority over local issues in order to promote an
efficient government responsible to its citizenry. Implied preemption to home rule,
such as argued by Mr. Smith and supported by the dissenters of the court, carves
away at municipal authority and defeats the purpose and intent of the Legislature.
Although the statutory scheme permits the courts to find preemption in cases where
authority is denied by "clear implication," the purpose of home rule and the well-
being of Maine's citizens would be best served if the Legislature explicitly pre-
empted authority when it intended to do so. It may be unrealistic to expect the
Legislature to anticipate every claim of preemption, but judicial determination
should be reserved only for those rare instances when it could not have been pre-
dicted and addressed by the Legislature. In those cases, the current standard of
implied preemption, that of frustrating the purpose of state law, should be nar-
rowly interpreted as it was by the majority of the court in Smith. Preserving home
rule advances the intent of the Legislature and provides local citizens the account-
ability and responsiveness that is the hallmark of American democracy.
Shane Wright
220. See, e.g., supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 52 and 121.
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